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ABSTRACT
Most previous works in privacy of Online Social Networks (OSN) fo-
cus on a restricted scenario of using one type of information to infer
another type of information or using only static profile data such as
username, profile picture or home location. However the multime-
dia footprints of users has become extremely diverse nowadays. In
reality, an adversary would exploit all types of information obtain-
able over time, to achieve its goal. In this paper, we analyse OSN
privacy by jointly exploiting longterm multimodal information. We
focus in particular on inference of social relationships. We consider
five popular components of posts shared by users, namely images,
hashtags, captions, geo-locations and published friendships. Large
scale evaluation on a real-world OSN dataset shows that while our
monomodal attacks achieve strong predictions, our multimodal
attack leads to a stronger performance with AUC (area under the
ROC curve) above 0.9. Our results highlight the need for multi-
modal obfuscation approaches towards protecting privacy in an era
where multimedia footprints of users get increasingly diverse.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become an indispensable part
of people’s life in the modern society. Leading players in the busi-
nesses, such as Facebook and Instagram, have acquired a large num-
ber of users. Initially, people used OSNs mostly to articulate their
friendships. With time, online activities have become increasingly
elaborate and diverse. Users publish tweets on Twitter, statuses
on Facebook and captions on Instagram. Photos constitute a large
proportion of the social media content. People also share their loca-
tions, popularly known as check-ins, via GPS-enabled smartphones.
More recently, hashtags have become very popular for content dis-
covery and advertisement. Figure 1 shows an example of a typical
OSN/Instagram post that consists of a photo, shared with a textual
caption, supplemented with hashtags, and a geo-tagged location.
Extensive amounts of such diverse user data is generated in
OSNs everyday which has been exploited by various parties to gain
a deeper understanding of our society. On the downside, privacy
risks stemming from data sharing in OSNs have become a major
concern. Researchers have highlighted potential attacks on various
aspects, e.g., social security number prediction [1], stalking and
re-identification [12] and various inference attacks. However, most
prior works in this direction explore only a single kind of user
generated content to infer another hidden attribute. For example,
Backes et al. [3] infer social relations from users’ locations; Zhang
Figure 1: Example of an Instagram post containing multi-
modal information. We investigate privacy threats emerg-
ing in such a multimodal setting against an adversary that
uses a combination of images, locations, text and hashtags
shared with a post as well as already revealed friendships
between users of an OSN.
et al. [46] infer user locations from hashtags; Shoshitaishvili et
al. [38] infer pairs that are dating using facial recognition. In a
realistic scenario, adversaries would utilize not just a single kind
but as many different kinds of data as possible to achieve their
goal. Works that do consider heterogeneous data [9] utilize only
a single instance of static profile data such as username, profile
picture, home location, etc or a footprint of only one modality
[22]. However, users generate much more than only one kind of
content and they generate this multimodal content continuously.
The multimodal footprint of users built up over time from the
data they post everyday, collectively gives a much more faithful
reflection of the user’s interests. Such multimedia footprints of
users are also getting increasingly diverse.
In order to fully assess the privacy risks arising from such multi-
modal footprints over time, a comprehensive evaluation is needed
which, to our knowledge, has not been addressed in the literature.
This paper aims to fill this gap with a framework incorporating
multimodal data in OSNs to assess users’ privacy risks.
Out of the various privacy risks in OSNs, we concentrate on
inferring social relations. Social relationships are recognized to
pose high threats to user privacy. In addition to revealing users’
social identities, social relationships can potentially leak further
sensitive attributes about a user, which the user explicitly intends
to hide in their own profile. In practice, OSN users have also begun
to increasingly hide their social circles [6].
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1.1 Contributions
We conduct the first large-scale privacy assessment of collective
multimodal information shared continuously over time in OSNs
against an adversary that leverages not just a single component
but combines all available components of user-generated content.
In particular, we consider five kinds of information: images, texts,
location, hashtag, and (incomplete) social relations. We evaluate
on a real-life dataset containing 22 million user posts in two cities
which we collected from Instagram.
Our contributions are two-fold. First, we introduce three novel
monomodal friendship inference attacks based on hashtags, images,
and text, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work that uses text and image modalities to conduct friendship
inference in social networks. Our hashtag attack massively outper-
forms the only prior work on friendship inference from hashtags
[45] by 7%. We use self-engineered statistical features, such as the
entropy and frequency of usage patterns for our hashtag and text
based attacks. For images, we rely on a state-of-the-art ResNet
model to extract information from images. Experiments show that
our hashtag and text attacks achieve strong performance with AUCs
above 0.86 and 0.83 respectively. Our image attack, while being the
weakest, still performs well with AUCs up to 0.637.
Second, we design a multimodal attack that combines five com-
ponents of posts to infer social relations. Extensive experiments
show that this attack outperforms all monomodal attacks with
AUCs above 0.9. We also show that the multimodal attack exploits
post components that compliment each other and the success of
most attacks increases significantly when combined with additional
components. We further demonstrate the robustness of the multi-
modal attack against information hiding, and show that even after
deleting 50% of the users’ posts, the drop in the attack performance
is relatively low.
1.2 Organization
In section 2, we present our user and adversary model and notations.
In section 3, we introduce our dataset. We present the design and
experimental evaluation of our attacks using texts, hashtags, images
and locations together with social network edges in sections 4, 5, 6
and 7 respectively. In section 8, we finally present the design and
evaluation for our multimodal attack. We discuss limitations of
the work and potential directions for future work in section 9 We
review the literature in section 10, and finally conclude the paper
in section 11.
2 MODEL
2.1 User Model
We define an OSN by an undirected, unweighted graph G = (U ,E),
where the set U contains all the users and E ⊆ {{u,v}|u ∈ U ,v ∈
U ,u , v} is the set of friendships. An edge exists between 2 users
if they mutually and visibly declare each other as friends in their
profiles.
A user u shares a set of posts Pu which can be composed of
images, texts, hashtags and location check-ins. We define a single
post pu ∈ Pu as a 4-tuple ⟨ip , ℓp , tp , Hp ⟩ which denotes that a user
u ∈ U posts an image ip , at location ℓp (checks in at ℓ), with a
text tp annotated with the set of hashtags Hp . All the posts of u is
defined by Pu = {p1u ,p2u . . .p |Pu |u }.
We denote the overall set of posts by P , images by I , textual
posts by T , the set of hashtags by H and the set of locations L.
Accordingly, for u, Iu ⊂ I represents the set of images, Hu ⊂ H
represents the set of hashtags, Tu ⊂ T the set of texts and Lu ⊂ L
the set of check-ins shared by u.
2.2 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary that tries to predict whether a pair of
individuals u and v that explicitly hide their friendship are socially
related or not. A pair of users can hide their friendship in differ-
ent ways depending on the OSN application, for example by not
following each other or not enlisting each other in their respective
friend lists. Users may want to do so for several reasons such as
suppressing a workplace romance, or protecting themselves from
target development by surveillance agencies ([42] reveals how NSA
collects mobility and travel habit data to spot new unknown asso-
ciates from already known targets). The adversary could be any
party with the ability to crawl an OSN and access user posts.
The adversary has access to posts shared by the pair of users
{u,v} namely Pu and Pu as well as the friendships explicitly pub-
lished on the OSN, E. A feature ®xD{u,v } for a pair {u,v}, is a function
of the posts Pu and Pv shared by them and friendships published
on the OSN, G. The adversary constructs features ®xD{u,v } from each
component of posts: hashtags, location check-ins, texts and images
as well as published friendships such that D ⊆ {H , T , I , L,E}. The
prediction attack is then a binary classification task f : ®xD{u,v } →
{0, 1}, where we encode the existence of friendship by the positive
class and the absence of friendship by the negative class. In the
upcoming sections, we describe the process of constructing the
features ®xD{u,v } from each of the individual data components.
We distinguish between 2 kinds of adversaries for ease of read-
ability. The first kind of adversary has access to and utilizes only a
single component of OSN posts. We name them according to the
information they have access to/use:
1. The Text Adversary, TAwhich uses the text component of OSN
posts. We denote the feature vector used for the corresponding
prediction task by ®xT{u,v } .
2. The Hashtag Adversary, HA which uses the hashtag compo-
nent of OSN posts. We denote the corresponding feature vector by
®xH{u,v } .
3. The Image Adversary, IA which uses the image component of
OSN posts. We denote the corresponding feature vector by ®x I{u,v } . 4.
The Location Adversary, LA which uses the location component of
OSN posts. We denote the corresponding feature vector by ®xL{u,v } .
5. The Network Adversary, NA which uses the friendships ex-
plicitly published by OSN users. Since friendships on the OSN are
represented by edges E, we denote the corresponding feature vector
by ®xE{u,v } .
We refer to this group of attacks as monomodal attacks.
The second kind of adversary combines multiple information
components shared by users of OSNs. We name such an adver-
sary as the Multimodal AdversaryM and this group of attacks as
2
multimodal attacks. When theM uses a subset D ′ of post compo-
nents, we call it a Subset Adversary SAD′ , D ′ ⊂ {H ,C, I ,L,E} and
2 ≤ |D ′ | ≤ 4.
3 DATASET
To evaluate our attacks, we use a dataset of Instagram, one of the
largest OSNs 1 of this era, which has been used previously for
other works [3], [46], [36], [45]. Ideal as it might be, it remains
infeasible to obtain the ground truth for a dataset where people
hide their friendship online in spite of secretly being friends in real
life. Therefore we adopt the best possible alternative and evaluate
our attacks on a simulation of the ideal dataset by using a real life
Instagram dataset. Compared to other OSNs like Twitter which is
mainly used for sharing news, current events and public statements,
Instagram is better suited for friendship inference as it is mainly
used to share topics related to lifestyle, interests, hobbies, leisure
and travel etc. Consequently, Instagram friends tend to be socially
closer in real life as well. On the other hand, crawling Facebook
(the largest OSN) is prohibited. Moreover, Instagram focuses more
on sharing of visual content and hashtags and is used by many
brands to humanize their content for better connecting customers
and growing brand awareness. A typical Instagram post as shown
in Figure 1 consists of a photo(s) or video along with captions and
hashtags and is geo-tagged with locations or Points of Interest
(POIs).
The dataset contains 8,309,482 posts from 10430 users in Los
Angeles and 14,671,556 posts from users in New York comprising of
photos, captions, hashtags and tagged locations that were publicly
posted along with the corresponding user ID, and for each user, the
respective followers. Moreover, there are 18,221 friend pairs for LA
out of which we obtain 17,043 pairs that have at least 1 out of the
5 types of feature data. From NY we collected 41,501 friend pairs,
out of which 40,883 pairs have feature data in at least 1 out of the 5
attack groups. For individual attacks, we eliminate friend pairs that
do not have the corresponding feature data.
We further do not target friendship inference between Instagram
accounts that are likely to be celebrities or bots. Therefore, we
filter out accounts whose numbers of followers are above the 90th
percentile (celebrities) or below the 10th percentile (bots) following
prior works, [3, 4, 37, 46].
Ethics. Our institution neither provides an IRB nor mandates (or
enables) approval for such experiments. Nevertheless, only publicly
available data is collected via Instagram’s public API in 2016. We
anonymize the datasets by removing all users’ screen names, and
replacing their Instagram IDs with randomly generated numbers.
Only these anonymized datasets are then stored for experiments in
a central server with up-to-date software, encrypted hard drives
and access only possible from two white-listed internal IP addresses
using authorized SSH keys.
4 ATTACK USING TEXT
In this section, we describe our friendship inference attack for the
Text Adversary TA followed by an experimental evaluation.
1https://www.dreamgrow.com/top-15-most-popular-social-networking-sites/
4.1 Attack Methodology
The Text Adversary TA has access to the text like tweets, statuses
or captions shared by users.
We design features for this attack in two phases:
4.1.1 Phase I. Wefirst collect all textual data shared by each user
and tokenize the text sequences. We weigh the tokens according
to the number of users in the overall OSN that use them such that
tokens used by a majority of users have lower weight than those
used by fewer users. To this end we use a Bag of Words model with
TF-IDF (Term-Frequency Inverse Document-Frequency). For a term
t and a document d , TF-IDF(t,d) is the product of the term frequency
tf(t,d) and inverse document frequency idf(t).
TF-IDF(t,d) = tf(t,d) × idf(t)
where term frequency is defined as tf(t,d) = nt,d∑
t ′∈d nt ′,d
with nt,d as
the number of times term t appears in document d and
∑
t ′∈d nt ′,d
as the total number of terms in d . Meanwhile, inverse document
frequency is idf(t) = loд nd1+df(d,t ) with nd as the total number of
documents and df(d, t) as the number of documents that contain
term t . As we see, the IDF reweights the popular but less interesting
words.
The resulting TF-IDF vectors are then normalized by the Eu-
clidean norm:
vnorm =
v
| |v | |2 =
v√
v12 +v22 + · · · +vn2
.
We therefore convert the text sequences of all users into a matrix
of TF-IDF vectors.
AssumingW is the overall set of words in the textual dataset
for a city or in other words, the vocabulary of the Text Adversary
TA, we denote each user’s TF-IDF vector by ®Tu ∈ R |W | such that
®Tu = (TF-IDF(t1,u), TF-IDF(t2,u), . . . , TF-IDF(t |W | ,u)).
4.1.2 Phase II. For each user pair {u,v}, we compare the TF-IDF
vectors ®Tu and ®Tv . We calculate 8 common pairwise distances to
form the feature vector for the Text Adversary namely ®xT{u,v } =
(cosine( ®Tu , ®Tv ), euclidean( ®Tu , ®Tv ), correlation( ®Tu , ®Tv ),
chebyshev( ®Tu , ®Tv ), bray_curtis( ®Tu , ®Tv ), canberra( ®Tu , ®Tv ),
manhattan( ®Tu , ®Tv ), sq_Euclidean( ®Tu , ®Tv )). Table 1 contains the
definitions of each measure.
4.2 Evaluation
We now present the preprocessing performed on the raw dataset,
followed by the experimental set-up and the metric we use for eval-
uating the prediction performance. Finally we present the results
of the experiments.
4.2.1 Data preprocessing. In LA, we have 10,018 users that share
a total of 7,146,810 captions with their Instagram posts. For NY we
have 12,756,384 captions shared by 18,713 users. In order to remove
terms that are too rare and too frequent, we filter out words that
appear in caption sequences of more than 100 users and less than 2
users. Following this step, we obtain 16,878 out of a total of 17,043
friend pairs from LA and 40,228 out of 40,883 friend pairs from NY.
We randomly sample an equal number of stranger pairs. Table 2
3
Table 1: Definitions of the common pairwise distance mea-
sures used for the textual attack. ®Tu represents the mean of
®Tu . ®Tu i represents the ith element in ®Tu .
measure definition
cosine( ®Tu , ®Tv ) ®Tu · ®Tv| | ®Tu | |2 | | ®Tv | |2
euclidean( ®Tu , ®Tv ) | | ®Tu − ®Tv | |2
correlation( ®Tu , ®Tv ) ( ®Tu− ®Tu )·( ®Tv− ®Tv )| | ®Tu− ®Tu | |2 | | ®Tv− ®Tv | |2
chebyshev( ®Tu , ®Tv ) maxdi=1 | ®Tu i − ®Tv i |
bray_curtis( ®Tu , ®Tv )
∑d
i=1 | ®Tu i− ®Tv i |∑d
i=1 | ®Tu i+ ®Tv i |
canberra( ®Tu , ®Tv ) ∑di=1 | ®Tu i− ®Tv i || ®Tu i |+ | ®Tv i |
manhattan( ®Tu , ®Tv ) ∑di=1 | ®Tu i − ®Tv i |
sq_Euclidean( ®Tu , ®Tv ) | | ®Tu − ®Tv | |22
shows the number of users, terms and friend pairs that we have
after pre-processing.
Table 2: Pre-processed caption data statistics.
LA NY
users 10,018 18,713
terms 587,190 886,120
friend pairs 16,878 40,228
4.2.2 Experimental Set-up. We rely on a random forest with 100
trees to carry out this and all further attacks as it outperforms other
classifiers like Gradient Boosting Machine, Ada Boost, Support Vec-
tor Machine and Logistic Regression in our experiments. Increasing
the number of trees beyond 100 did not significantly change our
performance.
We perform a 5-fold cross validation with a 80-20 split into
training and test set. We do not tune any parameters and therefore
do not require a validation subset.
4.2.3 Metric. We evaluate our attack using the AUC (Area Un-
der the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) Curve) metric. AUC
exhibits a number of desirable properties when compared to ac-
curacy such as decision threshold independence and invariance
to a priori class probabilities. The latter is particularly desired for
friendship inference in OSNs in order to correctly evaluate the at-
tacks in our down-sampled prediction space. Moreover, there exists
a conventional standard for interpreting AUC in a rather intuitive
manner. For AUCs in the range [0.5, 1], with 0.5 associated with
random guessing and 1 with perfect guessing, values above 0.8
represent a very good prediction and values above 0.9 represent
excellent prediction. This simplicity renders comparison against
baseline models dispensable.
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Figure 2: Comparison of individual features for our Text Ad-
versary
4.2.4 Results. We first assess how each the 8 individual distance
measures perform on their own and thus compare their AUC values
in the unsupervised setting in Figure 2. We see that correlation
achieves the highest score in both cities, with an AUC value of 0.82
for LA and 0.84 for NY. Squared Euclidean, Bray-Curtis, Euclidean
and cosine distance achieve only slightly lower AUCs.
This shows that the success of our attack is not dependant on
the city from which we collect our data. In the supervised setting,
we further achieve a much stronger performance in both cities with
AUC of 0.83 for LA and 0.85 for NY.
It is worth noting that newer, more advanced NLP techniques
might be more optimal for the prediction task. However, this paper
is focussed on highlighting the privacy risks from an adversary
that combines multiple modalities and the need to defend against
such multimodal attacks. Other state-of-the-art techniques can be
adopted similarly in a straightforward manner.
5 ATTACKS USING HASHTAGS
We now describe our friendship inference attack for the Hashtag
Adversary HA along with an experimental evaluation.
5.1 Attack Methodology
We train a machine learning classifier with the auxiliary knowl-
edge of the adversary which consists of a 10-dimensional feature
space which we present below. The adversary uses the trained clas-
sifier and carries out his inference attack on a target user pair by
computing these scores for the pair using their hashtag sharing
information.
Our feature design is influenced by certain properties we ob-
served during preliminary analyses on our dataset. These properties
fall into 2 main directions namely the hashtags shared in common
by a user pair and the information content or the relevance of
individual hashtags.
Firstly in Figure 3 we observe that in both cities, friends tend
to have a higher number of hashtags in common as compared to
strangers. The fraction of common hashtags, (number of overlap-
ping hashtags divided by the total number of hashtags shared by
both users), also shows a similar property; a high fraction of the
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Figure 3: CCDF of the number and fraction of hashtags in
common between friends versus strangers.
overall hashtags shared by a user overlaps with the hashtags shared
by a friend of the user. Moreover, we only consider stranger pairs
that have at least 1 hashtag in common. Including stranger pairs
with no common hashtags would only further increase the gap
between the friend and stranger curves. The number of common
hashtags shared by a user pair therefore appears to be a very good
indicator of the existence of friendships between them which moti-
vates the design of our first 4 features. Denoting the set of hashtags
shared by user u and user v by Hu and Hv respectively, we define
xcomm and xfrac as the number and fraction respectively of hashtags
shared by both users.
xcomm = |Hu ∩ Hv | (1)
xfrac =
|Hu ∩ Hv |
|Hu ∪ Hv | (2)
We define xdotp as the (dot product of) number of times the com-
mon hashtags were shared by both users. We represent the number
of times a particular user u shares each hashtag hi ∈ H as a user-
hashtag count vector ®nu = (nu,h1 ,nu,h2 , . . .nu,h |H | ), where nu,hi
is the number of times hi is shared by u. We use ®nv analogously for
user v in a pair. We define xcos as the cosine similarity between the
user-hashtag count vectors ®nu and ®nv for a user pair {u,v}. Thus,
xdotpro = ®nu ®nv (3)
xcosine =
®nu ®nv√
®nu 2 ®nv 2
(4)
The second property that can be observed in Figure 4 (left) is
that hashtags shared by only a small number of users regularly are
more likely to hold special significance for them, such as hobbies,
places visited, private clubs, jargon, acronyms and idioms and so on.
Conversely, hashtags shared at least as frequently but by a larger
number of users are likely to be merely common terms and not
characteristic of a socially related users.
We therefore formalize the notion that a shared hashtag is more
likely to reveal the relationship between users if it is less popular
in general. We denote the number of times a particular hashtag h
was shared by each user ui ∈ U as a hashtag-user count vector
®nh = (nh,u1 ,nh,u2 , . . .nh,u |U | ), where nh,ui is the number of times
ui shares h. We define xminH as the minimum of the total number of
times all users shared a hashtag among the set of common hashtags
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Figure 4: Average probability that two users who share the
same hashtag are friends as a function of (left) overall pop-
ularity of the hashtag and (right) entropy of the hashtag us-
age. The left x-axis marks the usage count which is the total
number of times the corresponding hashtag was shared by
all users in the OSN. The right x-axis marks the entropy of
the vector counting the number of times the corresponding
hashtag was shared by various users.
between u and v . We represent the total number of times all users
U shared a hashtag hi by nhi =
∑
u ∈U nhi ,u .
xminH =min(nhi : (hi ∈ Hu ∩ Hv )) (5)
Following the common Adamic Adar (Frequency-Weighted Com-
mon Neighbors) [2] score, we define xaaH as the sum of the recipro-
cals of the logarithm of nhi which is the number of times a hashtag
hi common between u and v was shared by all users.
xaaH =
∑
hi ∈Hu∩Hv
1
lognhi
(6)
The Adamic Adar measure improves counting of common fea-
tures by giving more weight to rarer features. We adapt the measure
in an Information Theoretic approach to formalize the intuitive no-
tion that lower entropies are more informative. We define entropy
E of a hashtag hi as the entropy of its hashtag-user count vector
over all users U such that Ei = E( ®nhi ). Therefore, we define xminE
as the minimum among the entropies of all common hashtags,
xminE =min(Ei : (hi ∈ Hu ∩ Hv )) (7)
and xaa as the sum of the reciprocals of entropies of each common
hashtag
xaaE =
∑
hi ∈Hu∩Hv
1
Ei
(8)
In the direction of the second property, we also measure the
number of times different users share a particular hashtag as a count
vector for a hashtag and then calculate the entropy of the count
vectors for all hashtags in our dataset. Figure 4 (right) further shows
that hashtags whose usage count vectors have lower entropies are
more indicative of social relations between their users. We therefore
formalize the property that rare hashtags with lower entropies are
more useful. We define xw_aaE as xaa weighted by the number of
hashtags shared by both users and xf _aaE as xaa weighted by the
sum of the reciprocals of entropies of hashtags shared by both users.
5
xw_aaE =
xaaE
|Hu ∪ Hv | (9)
xf _aaE =
xaaE∑
hi ∈Hu∪Hv
1
Ei
(10)
Thus we represent the feature vector for the Hashtag Adversary
HA for a pair of users {u,v} as ®xH{u,v } = (xcomm, xfrac, xdotpro, xcosine,
xminH , xaaH , xminE, xaaE, xw_aaE, xf _aaE)
5.2 Evaluation
We evaluate the attack in the same way as for the caption attack, i.e.
using AUC for a random forest with five-fold cross validation. We
first explain the data preprocessing, followed by a baseline method
proposed in a recent work. Finally we present the results of the
experiments.
Table 3: Pre-processed hashtag data statistics.
LA NY
posts 1,712,500 2,999,603
users 10,359 18,896
hashtags 406,692 595,502
friend pairs 5,229 12,765
5.2.1 Data preprocessing. We have 2,306,631 unique hashtags
shared by 10,418 users in our raw dataset from LA. For NY, we have
3,090,451 unique hashtags shared by 19,015 users.In order to remove
hashtags that are shared too frequently and too infrequently, we
filter out hashtags that are shared by less than 2 and more than 10
users.
Following this step, we obtain 5229 out of a total of 17,043 friend
pairs from LA and 12,765 out of 40,883 friend pairs from NY. We
randomly sample an equal number of stranger pairs. Table 3 shows
the number of users, terms and friend pairs that we have after
preprocessing.
5.2.2 Baseline. We consider as baseline, the only prior work by
Zhang et al. [45] that rely on hashtags to perform friendship predic-
tion. This method uses a user-hashtag bipartite graph embedding
model to automatically summarize hashtag profiles as features for
users.
5.2.3 Results. We first compare the performance of the 10 indi-
vidual features on their own by evaluate each in an unsupervised
setting. Figure 5 shows the AUC values. We see that xw_aaE achieves
the highest score with an AUC of 0.87 for NY and 0.85 for LA, closely
followed by xf _aaE with an AUC of 0.87 for NY and 0.85 for LA.
Both features are based on the property that rare hashtags with
lower entropies are more informative. At the third place is the co-
sine distance between the user-hashtag count vectors xcosine with
an AUC of 0.8263 followed by xaaH , xminH and xfrac with AUCs of
0.8076, 0.7999 and 0.7848 respectively. We see that the remaining
features are significantly outperformed. Nevertheless, they perform
much better than random guessing.
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Figure 5: Comparison of individual features for ourHashtag
Adversary
These results show that the success of our hashtag attack is
independent of the city from which we collect our data. Although
6 out the 10 features perform sufficiently well on their own, using
them in a supervised setting with the random forest yields stronger
performances in both cities, with an AUC value of 0.86 for LA and
0.87 for NY.
In contrast, the baseline method achieves an AUC of 0.8 in Los
Angeles and 0.82 in New York. Its also noteworthy that this method
involves training many hyperparameters using cross validation just
for learning features. This huge overhead in processing required in
this baseline, combined with around 7% lower AUC compared to
our method, clearly demonstrates the strength of hand-engineered
features for a privacy attack such as friendship inference.
6 ATTACK USING IMAGES
In this section, we describe our friendship inference attack using
images followed by an experimental evaluation.
6.1 Attack Methodology
The Image Adversary (IA) tries to infer social relationships using
the content of the images posted by users on an OSN. We do not
use facial recognition in these images following the assumption
that users who wish to hide their friendship with a certain people
would refrain from posting a picture with them in the first place.
6.1.1 Extracting Information from Images. The recent advent of
deep neural networks (NNs) and the availability of massive comput-
ing power and datasets, has facilitated huge breakthroughs in image
classification. In addition to high image classification accuracies,
pre-trained NNs can directly be used on any image to automatically
obtain a meaningful feature representation of the image. This is
why we choose a NN based approach for our Image Adversary.
We use a Residual Neural Network (ResNet) which is an ad-
vanced type of a convolutional NN for meaningfully extracting
information from images. ResNets solve the problem of degrad-
ing/saturating accuracy that is faced by increasing the depth of
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deep convolutional NNs [15]. Moreover, training ResNets is easier
than training convolutional NNs when they need to get deeper
in order to solve increasingly complex tasks. We adopt a ResNet
namely the Places365-ResNet18 model for PyTorch trained on the
Places365-Standard Database [47] which allows learning of deep
scene features for various scene recognition tasks. The training set
consists of 1.8 million images from 365 scene categories, with at
most 5000 images per category, consistent with real-world frequen-
cies of occurrence. 2
We now describe the feature design process for our attack.
6.1.2 Feature Design. We extract the final softmax output layer
produced by the neural network for each of the images shared
by users in our dataset. For an image Ii , the final layer is a poste-
rior probability distribution over the 365 classes that correspond
to the 365 different scene categories c1, . . . , c365 which we rep-
resent by ®Ci =Pr(c1, . . . , c365 |Ii ). For each user u we count the
number of images that belong to each of the 365 scene categories.
An image belongs to a category if its corresponding class member-
ship probability outputted by the ResNet is higher than a certain
percentile threshold (which we describe during the dataset pre-
processing in section 6.2.1). We denote this count by the vector
®nu = (nu,1,nu,2, . . .nu,365) where nu,c represents the number of
images shared by user u that depict the scene corresponding to
category number c . We use ®nv analogously for user v in a pair.
We then design a set of 4 feature types for each user pair {u,v} as
follows:
1. We define the feature min_count as the category-wise min-
imum of the 2 count vectors ®nu and ®nv i.e. out of the number of
images posted by both users in each of the 365 categories, we count
the minimums, min_count = (min (nu,1, nv,1), min(nu,2, nv,2), . . .
min (nu,365, nv,365))
2. We define the feature xcosine as the cosine distance between
the category-wise count vectors ®nu and ®nv .
3. We define the feature xF_maxcat as the maximum over the 365
components of the vector min_count, which represents the fre-
quency of the mutually most frequently shared category in images
shared by both users. xF_maxcat =
max(min(nu,1, nv,1), min(nu,2, nv,2), . . . min(nu,365, nv,365))
4. We perform a category-wise sum of the posterior probabili-
ties over all images shared by each user which we represent by a
usage-vector ®sc = (sc,u1 , sc,u2 , . . . sc,u |U | ), where sc,uj represents
the summed up probability that a category c is depicted over all
images shared by uj . We define the feature xE_maxcat as the entropy
of the usage-vector ®smaxcat of the mutually most frequently shared
categorymaxcat .
Finally, we represent the feature vector for the Image Adversary
for a pair of users {u,v} as ®x I{u,v } = (min_count, xcosine, xF_maxcat,
xE_maxcat).
6.2 Evaluation
We evaluate the attack in the same way as for the previous attacks,
i.e. using the AUCmetric for a random forest classifier and assigning
2The scene category list can be found on https://github.com/metalbubble/places_
devkit/blob/master/categories_places365.txt
Table 4: Pre-processed image data statistics.
LA NY
users 5,082 12,575
images 2,052,619 4,840,670
friend pairs 4,262 18,847
80% of each of the friend and stranger pairs for training and 20% of
each of the friend and stranger pairs for testing.
6.2.1 Data preprocessing. We could download 4,857,971 pho-
tos from 8,309,482 urls for our image-based attack from LA and
5,092,951 photos from 14,671,592 urls from NY. We feed each of
these photos onto our pre-trained ResNet model and extract the
final layer, i,e the probability distribution over the 365 scene cat-
egories. We only require the significant scene categories that are
predicted to be depicted in an image. Therefore, we first remove
the category probabilities lower than 5% by setting them to 0. We
obtain 4,262 out of a total of 17,043 friend pairs from LA and 18,837
out of a total of 40,883 friend pairs from NY. We randomly sample
an equal number of stranger pairs. Table 4 shows the number of
users, images and friend pairs that we have after preprocessing.
6.2.2 Results. In order to evaluate how each of the features per-
form on their own, we evaluate each of them in an unsupervised
setting. Figure 6 shows the AUC values for the individual features
for our attack namely min_count, xcosine, xF_maxcat and xE_maxcat.
We see that both min_count and xcosine perform equally in both
cities. In NY, min_count performs the best (AUC 0.63) followed by
xcosine (AUC 0.61). In LA, xcosine performs the best (AUC 0.58)
followed by min_count (AUC 0.57). In the supervised setting, we
achieve an AUC value of 0.64 for NY and 0.60 for LA. Figure 7 shows
the AUC values of the image attack in the supervised setting com-
pared with the other attacks using hashtag, text, location, partial
network data as well as the multimodal attack.
Although the performance is relatively weak, we can still infer a
signal and perform much better than random guessing. Inferring
the content of images is an inherently hard problem. Technology
has not yet been able to achieve what an average human can in
terms of drawing conclusions from the contents of a single image.
Most research on computer vision and face recognition techniques
work only with small labelled datasets and the scalability to real
world, unseen data is yet to be explored. We are the first to perform
image content analysis on a large scale real world dataset. Since in
the large scale, an adversary using computer vision techniques can
perform inference attacks in a matter of seconds, privacy analysis
of image content remains an important problem.
7 ATTACK USING LOCATIONS AND
NETWORK INFORMATION
In this section we present the details of our Location Adversary
LA and Network Adversary NA, both of which are based on state-
of-the-art methods. The Location Adversary (LA) uses check-in
data following walk2friends and the Network Adversary NA uses
already published friendships in the OSN loosely following node2vec
for edge based link prediction. We give a brief overview of the
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Figure 6: Comparison of individual features for our Image
Adversary
attack first for LA and next for NA. We follow up with experimental
evaluation.
7.1 Location Adversary
The Location Adversary (LA) has access to locations shared by
users and tries to infer whether a pair of users are socially re-
lated. Using check-in information for inference of users’ social
relations has been extensively studied. We adopt the state-of-the-
art method walk2friends[3] that has been shown to outperform
other approaches.
The walk2friends method can be explained in three steps: First,
we organize users and locations into a bipartite graph, with the
number of visits by a user to a location as the weight of the cor-
responding edge. Second, multiple random walks are performed
on the graph to generate a set of walk traces with the transition
probability from one node to another defined over the edge weight.
Finally, we utilize the skip-gram model [26, 27] to embed each user
into a continuous vector. The vector for a user u, is denoted by ®Eu .
To perform friendship prediction, we follow the image and text
attacks above. Concretely, for two users u and v , we define the fol-
lowing feature vector ®xL{u,v } = (cosine( ®Eu , ®Ev ), euclidean( ®Eu , ®Ev ),
correlation( ®Eu , ®Ev ), chebyshev( ®Eu , ®Ev ), bray_curtis( ®Eu , ®Ev ),
canberra( ®Eu , ®Ev ),manhattan( ®Eu , ®Ev ), sq_Euclidean( ®Eu , ®Ev ))
and train a random forest classifier to perform our attack.
7.2 Network Adversary
Our network adversary (NA) has access to a limited fraction of re-
lationships in the online social network and tries to predict these
missing relationships. This is inline with the traditional setting
of link prediction. We leverage state-of-the-art tool node2vec to
implement NA [13], which has been shown to outperform tradi-
tional methods, such as Jaccard Index, Adamic-Adar score, and
Preferential Attachment.
node2vec first performs random walk on the partial social net-
work, this again results in a set of truncated random walk traces.3
Then, skip-gram is adopted to embed each user u into a vector
®Fu . For two users u and v , we define their feature vector as the
Hadamard product between their vectors [13], i.e., ®xE{u,v } = ®Fu ◦ ®Fv .
3We follow the default parameter setting of node2vec in the random walk.
Table 5: Pre-processed location and network data statistics.
(a)
LA NY
users 10,430 19,038
locations 23,452 30,073
friend pairs 17,043 40,883
(b)
LA NY
users 9,347 17,853
friend pairs 16,294 39,756
7.3 Evaluation
We evaluate the attacks in the same way as described previously, i.e.
using the AUC metric for a random forest classifier and assigning
80% of each of the friend and stranger pairs for training and 20% of
each of the friend and stranger pairs for testing.
7.3.1 Data Preprocessing. For the Location Adversary, following
[3], we filter out users who have not visited at least two different
locations since such accounts with many check-ins at one location
are most likely to be local businesses for example bars and pubs.
We further filter out users with less than 20 check-ins, whom we
consider to be active users. We obtain 17,043 friends pairs from LA
and 40,883 from NY.
For the Network Adversary, we start with the friend pairs gen-
erated for the hashtag, location, image, and text based attacks as
described above. We randomly sample 80% of these friend pairs to
generate a partial network graph G′ which we use for building the
node2vec embedding for users. These set of edges in our training
set is a proper subset of the original graph G. We obtain 16,294
friends pairs from LA and 39,756 from NY. For both attacks, we
randomly select an equal number of stranger pairs out of the set
of already sampled stranger pairs for the hashtag, image, and text
attacks. Tables 5a and 5b present the preprocessed data statistics
for both attacks.
7.3.2 Results. We achieve AUC values of 0.77 for both LA and
NY, respectively for the location based attack. Though different
datasets, our results are quite close to the one reported in [3]. We
achieve AUC values of 0.75 and 0.78 for LA and NY respectively for
the network based attacks.
8 MULTIMODAL ATTACK
We now present the Multimodal AdversaryM, which leverages
information from all 5 components of user posts presented in the
previous sections, to infer social relationships. We first present the
attackmethodology along with a variant called the subset adversary.
We follow up with an empirical evaluation as well as robustness of
the attacks against information hiding.
Overview of the Fusion Mechanism The previous attacks were
based on training a machine learning classifier which required a
feature design process (hand-engineered or aided by deep learning
techniques). For this attack, we use the features already designed
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for the 5 individual post components as described in each previous
attack section. However, we weigh the information from each of the
5 components according to their relative trustworthiness, which
we infer from the strength of the individual attacks. To this end, we
divide the training set Vtrain into 2 sets. We use one set to train the
5 random forest classifiers using the 5 respective feature vectors.
We use the second set to assign a confidence score a to each of the 5
trained classifiers using their respective AUC values. We use these
AUC values as indicators of the strength or trustworthiness of the
predictions made by the 5 classifiers on the target set Vtar.
8.1 Attack Methodology
We describe this attack in 4 stages.
In the first stage, we divide the training set Vtrain into 2 parts:
Vtrain-train and Vtrain-test. We train the classifiers for the five
modalities separately using the feature vectors ®xH{u,v }, ®xT{u,v }, ®x I{u,v },
®xL{u,v } and ®xE{u,v } on the set Vtrain-train.
In the second stage, from each of the 5 trained random forests, we
extract the respective posterior probabilities for the friend class, i.e.
the probability with which a sample pair in the set Vtar is socially
related. In a random forest, the predicted posterior probabilities of
an input sample are computed as the mean predicted class probabil-
ities of the trees. The class probability of a single tree is the fraction
of samples of the same class in a leaf.
Let xH , xC , x I , xL and xE denote the posterior probabilities
for the friend class for a sample {u,v} ∈ Vtar as predicted by the
classifier trained using hashtag, text, image, location and friendship
information respectively. Therefore we have for D ∈ {H , T , I , L,E}
, xD{u,v } = Pr(R {u,v } = 1| ®xD{u,v }), where R {u,v } is the random
variable representing the relationship between the user pair {u,v}.
In the third stage, we calculate a confidence score a for each of
the 5 attack components above. Let aH , aT , aI , aL and aE denote
the confidence scores of the hashtag, text, image, location and
friendship attacks respectively. We use the Area under the ROC
curve (AUC) score between the true class labels and the predicted
posterior probabilities for the set Vtrain-test for the friend class as
the confidence score. Therefore we have for D ∈ {H , T , I , L,E} and
{u,v} ∈ Vtrain-test,
aD = AUC(y{u,v },xD{u,v })
where y denotes true class labels and xD{u,v } denotes the predicted
posterior probabilities.
In the fourth and final stage, we perform a weighted averaging
of the 5 posterior probabilities for each sample {u,v} ∈ Vtar using
their normalized confidence scores. We obtain the final score sM{u,v }
for a sample {u,v} ∈ Vtar for the Multimodal AdversaryM as,
sM{u,v } =
∑
D∈{H,T, I,L,E }
xD{u,v } ∗
aD∑
D∈{H,T, I,L,E }
aD
8.2 Subset Adversaries
We further analyze how various combinations of individual post
components perform towards inferring friendship between OSN
user pairs. To this end we model a reduced Multimodal Adversary
which uses a proper subset of the set of texts, hashtags, images,
locations and friendship-edges published by OSN users, such that
the adversary does not use at least 1 component out of the 5 post
components. We call such an adversary that uses a subset D ′ of
post components, a Subset Adversary SAD′ . The adversary uses any
combination of a minimum of 2 upto a maximum of 4 out of the 5
post components, thus we have 25 different possible combination.
Therefore we calculate the corresponding score sD′{u,v } as:
sD
′
{u,v } =
∑
D∈D′
xD{u,v } ∗
aD∑
D∈D′
aD
where D ′ ⊂ {H ,C, I ,L,E} and 2 ≤ |D ′ | ≤ 4
8.3 Evaluation
We first present a baseline approach which we design to evaluate
the multimodal attack. We then describe the dataset and evaluation
metric. We then discuss the results, followed by an analysis of the
interplay between the different modalities. We end the section with
an analysis of the robustness of the attack against the amount of
data present in the OSN.
8.3.1 Baseline. We implement a baseline that performs a simple
averaging of the posterior probabilities from each data component.
Thus the baseline score sBL{u,v } for a sample {u,v} ∈ Vtar with
posterior probabilities xD{u,v } where D denotes the individual data
component which is used by each attack is defined as sBL{u,v } =∑
D∈{H,T, I,L,E} xD{u,v }
|D |
8.3.2 Dataset and metric. We use the same dataset as for the
individual attacks. As mentioned earlier, we obtained 17,043 friend
pairs for LA and 40,883 friend pairs for New York. We collect the
stranger pairs sampled in the hashtag, image, and textual attacks.
Each pair in this resultant dataset for the Multimodal Adversary
has feature values for at least one out of the set {®xH{u,v } (hashtag),
®x I{u,v } (image), ®xT{u,v } (text), ®xL{u,v } (location) and ®xE{u,v } (partial
network) }.
Following the other attacks, we evaluate this attack also using
the AUC metric. However, unlike the other attacks for single post
components, for the multimodal attack, we only calculate a score
s {u,v } for each sample pair instead of designing a set of features.
Thus we do not need to employ a supervised machine learning
classifier, instead we directly calculate the area under the ROC
curve for the multimodal scores s {u,v } of the target pairs.
8.3.3 Results. We now discuss the results of our multimodal
and subset adversaries.
Multimodal AdversaryM. For our Multimodal Adversary using
the weighted average score sM{u,v } as described above, we achieve
a very strong performance in both cities with an AUC of 0.925 for
LA and 0.905 for New York. For the baseline approach, using the
simple average score sBL{u,v } , we achieved an AUC of 0.924 for LA
and 0.875 for New York
We also compare the multimodal attack with the 5 monomodal
attacks in Figure 7.
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Table 6: Performance of the subset adversaries (multimodal attacks using size-2, size-3 and size-4 subsets of the 5 post compo-
nents) for LA and NY. The best performance for subsets of each size is marked in bold.
(a) Attacks using 2 components
Attack Data LA NY
{T ,E} 0.865 0.885
{L,E} 0.909 0.836
{T , L} 0.901 0.876
{H , T } 0.821 0.842
{H , I } 0.767 0.761
{H , L} 0.805 0.796
{H ,E} 0.785 0.819
{T , I } 0.818 0.834
{L, I } 0.825 0.767
{I ,E} 0.709 0.742
(b) Attacks using 3 components
Attack Data LA NY
{T ,E, L} 0.928 0.905
{H , L,E} 0.913 0.857
{H , T , I } 0.816 0.835
{H , T , L} 0.903 0.877
{H , T ,E} 0.860 0.883
{H , I , L} 0.843 0.800
{H , I ,E} 0.758 0.791
{T , I ,E} 0.859 0.879
{T , I , L} 0.901 0.875
{I , L,E} 0.903 0.830
(c) Attacks using 4 components
Attack Data LA NY
{H , T , L,E} 0.927 0.905
{T , I , L,E} 0.927 0.902
{H , T , I , L} 0.903 0.877
{H , T , I ,E} 0.854 0.877
{H , I , L,E} 0.908 0.852
HA IA TA LA NA HA IA TA LA NA
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Figure 7: Comparison of the AUC values achieved by all 6
adversaries (the Hashtag (HA), Image (IA), Text (TA), Location
(LA), Network (NA) and the Multimodal AdversaryM).
The multimodal attack achieves the strongest performance for
both cities. Moreover, the attacks using only hashtags and only
text significantly outperform the attacks using only images, only
locations and only friendship edges. We also list these AUC values
in Table 6 for comparison with the subset adversaries.
Subset Adversaries SAD′ . Table 6 presents the AUCs of size-2,
size-3 and size-4 subset adversaries. The best performance for sub-
sets of each size is marked in bold. Among all subset sizes, the attack
using the size-3 set of texts, friendship-edges, and location infor-
mation performs the best for both LA and New York with AUCs
of 0.928 and 0.905 respectively. The size-4 set of texts, locations,
edge-friendships and hashtags perform equally strongly for New
York with the same AUC and only slightly less strongly for LA with
an AUC of 0.927. The highest performance among size-2 subsets is
achieved by the combination of LA and NA (0.909) for Los Angeles
and the combination of TA and NA (0.885) for New York.
The worst performance in both cities is seen in the attack com-
bining images and friendship-edges with an AUC of 0.709 for LA
and 0.742 for New York. This result is not surprising given that the
individual attacks using only image have the worst performance for
Figure 8: Matrix showing AUCs achieved by complementary
components (size-2 subset adversary) left: NY, right: LA.
both cities and for LA, the attack using only friendship-edges is the
second worst. For New York it is the attack using only locations that
is the second worst and unsurprisingly the set using both images
and locations has one of the weakest AUCs of 0.767.
8.3.4 Interplay between Modalities. We now discuss some in-
teresting observations on the effect of different modalities on each
other.
Complementary Components. The diagonal elements in Figure
8 further show the AUCs of the monomodal adversaries and the
non-diagonal elements show size-2 subset adversaries. The greener
elements show increasing AUCs and the redder elements show
decreasing AUCs. We see from Figure 8 that certain components
complement each other e.g. for the LA dataset, locations and images
on their own achieve very lowAUCs of 0.7663 and 0.594 respectively
but when combined together the AUC goes up to 0.825 which is a
significant increase! Edges achieve an AUC of 0.751 on its own, but
when it is combined with locations, the AUC shoots to 0.909! Yet
another example is text which achieves an AUC of 0.836 on its own
but together with locations achieves a much higher AUC of 0.901!
These examples demonstrate that our fusion mechanism for the
Multimodal Adversary exploits these complementing components.
Combination of Weaker Components, Firstly, we note that the
best performing size-4 subset but with images instead of hashtags
(D ′ = {T , I , L,E}) achieves the same AUC in LA and only slightly
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lower AUC of 0.902 for New York. This result is very interest-
ing given that our independent attack using images only is much
weaker than our attack using hashtags only. Moreover, both the at-
tacks using hashtags only and texts only, significantly outperformed
the attacks using only images, only locations and only friendship
edges. Thus it is very interesting to see that the attack using images,
locations and friendship-edges is significantly stronger than the
attack using hashtags together with texts (with an AUC of 0.903 for
the former versus 0.821 for the latter). The performance of images,
locations and friendship edges improves tremendously even when
combined with only 1 additional component. Also surprising is the
attack using images along with locations for LA. It is stronger than
the attack using images along with both hashtags and friendship-
edges (with an AUC of 0.825 for the former versus 0.758 for the
latter). This is interesting because the attack using only locations
has one of the poorest performance for LA. Thus we deduce that
even though some components are clearly outperformed by others
when used individually, they may contribute significantly towards
a much stronger inference attack when combined together with
other weak components.
Increasing Number of Components, In a majority of the cases,
we see from Table 6 that combining additional components im-
proves the attack success. For example adding one component to ei-
ther of the size-3 subsets {H , T , I }, {H , I , L}, {T , I , L} and {H , T , L}
to get the size-4 subset {H , T , I , L} always improved the AUC. The
same can be observed for other size-3 to size-4 transitions such as
{H , T , L}, {H , T ,E} or {H , L,E} to get {H , T , L,E} as well as size-2
to size-3 transitions such as {T ,E}, {T , L} and {E, L} to {T ,E, L}.
This underlines the effectiveness of our proposed fusion mechanism
for the Multimodal Adversary. Further, the success of the attacks
continue to increase consistently across cities as well.
Thus, increasing the number of components increases the attack
success for almost all cases except the transitions from the strongest
subset overall, i.e. {T ,E, L}. Moreover, the Multimodal Adversary
M using all 5 modalities does not have a significant increase in
performance over the best performing size-3 or the size-4 subsets
adversaries. This can be explained by the impact of the relatively
weak image component, which is unable to contribute to the in-
ference attack anymore beyond the performance achieved by the
remaining components.
We summarize our key observations as follows:
(1) Various pairs of components complement each others’ at-
tack success when combined.
(2) A combination of weaker components often increased the
attack performance more than a combination of stronger
components.
(3) Increasing the number of components almost always in-
crease the attack success.
8.4 Robustness
So far we have seen the severity of privacy risks arising from shar-
ing various types of posts on an OSN. An immediate question that
arises at this point is: Is the problem solved when users simply
shared posts less frequently, how is the performance is affected
if users shared a lower number of posts. We therefore evaluate
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Figure 9: Robustness of our attacks in the NY dataset against
removing posts.
the robustness of the four attacks namely the attacks using hash-
tags, texts, images and a combination of all three of them in the
multimodal setting. Robustness of the Location and Network Ad-
versaries has been extensively studied in prior work that proposed
walk2friends and node2vec.
We first randomly remove a certain proportion of posts pub-
lished by users and collect the images, hashtags, texts contained
in the remaining posts. Then we recompute the corresponding fea-
ture values for the training set of user pairs with which we then
train three random forest classifiers, one each for hashtags, texts
and images. We also use these three feature sets to carry out the
multimodal attack on the subset D ′ = {H ,C, I } as described in
table 6.
We begin by removing 10% of the original number of posts in
either dataset and increase the amount of posts to be removed in
steps of 10% until 50% of the original number of posts are removed.
The selection of posts to be removed is random.
Figure 9 shows the robustness of the attacks against removal for
NY. The y-axis shows the AUC attained at various percentage of
posts removed shown in the x-axis. Results for LA follow a similar
trend and can be found in the appendix in Figure 10. We see that
the performance drops gradually for all attacks except the attack
using images only. However the performance does not degrade
significantly even with 50% of the posts removed from the dataset.
This shows that the attacks are quite robust to the amount of data
present in the OSN. This calls for advanced defense mechanisms
against adversaries that utilize multiple kinds of user information
on OSNs for preserving both privacy as well as utility.
9 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
Our main goal is to show whether a combination of multiple modal-
ities improves the strength of an inference attack. The three individ-
ual monomodal attacks, i.e., text, images, and hashtags, presented
in this paper are first of its kind, and use the most popular and stan-
dard techniques. However, they may be further optimized using
newer techniques. Secondly, some of the unsupervised methods
work almost as good as the supervised attacks, which demonstrates
the power of the features we proposed. Thirdly, our attack may
results in false positives in case of users who are not socially re-
lated but post about similar, popular or trending topics or events.
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However, our attacks eliminate this effect, by favoring hashtags
with low entropy and using TF-IDF for text.
We demonstrated that our attacks are robust to the amount of
information shared by users. This highlights potential future work
in analysis of the attack performance by obfuscating components or
posts whose components have the highest contribution in predict-
ing friendship. A recent work AttriGuard [18] takes an adversarial
example based approach towards classification evasion to defend
against users location (city) inference. However, these defenses are
only on the personal attribute level and uses only type of public
data (user’s app rating scores in case of AttriGuard), whereas our
attack deals with multimodal data shared by the user (thousands of
images, captions, hashtags, locations). Applicability of evasion or
poisoning attacks requires further research. Secondly, we demon-
strated that the privacy threat is equally severe in datasets from
two different cities. The same framework can be used to analyse
data collected from other OSNs or other cities all around the world.
Finally, we only provide a lower bound on the performance of the
attacks. Considering factors like the date or time when 2 users
shared certain posts can potentially make the attacker stronger.
10 RELATEDWORK
We present literature review in each of the 5 components of OSN
data that we consider namely, link prediction, locations, text, images
and hashtags followed by research on OSN data in general. We also
report existing works that analyse their implications on the privacy
of users, in particular social relationships wherever applicable.
10.1 Link Prediction
Liben-Nowell et al. [21] were among the earliest to formalize the
link prediction problem in social networks. Since then, link predic-
tion has been extensively studied [11], [32], [44], [23], [8], including
the winners of the 2011 Kaggle Social Network Challenge [28] that
use link prediction for de-anonymization on Flickr data. We also
have a large-scale real-life dataset, however we exploit an advanced
deep-learning based approach node2vec [13] which is shown to
outperform other approaches. Other lines of work use social links
for attribute inference such as Gong et al. [10] infer attributes such
as major, employer, and cities lived from friendship and behavioural
links. We, however, try to infer social links from 5 types of user
generated content.
10.2 Location
Early works such as [7], [5], [34], [37], [43] infer social ties from
co-occurrence in time and space and require two users to share
common friends or locations. Olteanu et al. [30] study the effect of
co-location information on location privacy. More recently, Zhou
et al. [48] infer social links from friendships and mobility data.
Finally, Backes et al. [3] take a deep learning approach to learn users’
mobility features and use them for social relationship inference.
We adopt this approach for our location based attack since it best
fits our user and adversary model, and is shown to significantly
outperform prior approaches [34], [37], [43].
10.3 Text
The growth of textual data in OSNs has been exploited by a plethora
of advances in NLP and text mining. Kim et al. [19] study the influ-
ence of offline friendship on tweeting behavior, Adamic et al. [2]
proposed a matchmaking algorithm that leverages text, mailing list,
and in and out-link information to analyze the structure of a social
network. Preotiuc-Pietro et al. [35] study use language features like
unigrams, word clusters and emotions to predict political ideologies
of users. Tan et al. [41] characterize relations between ideas in texts
using co-occurrence within documents and prevalence correlation
over time. However friendship inference from textual content has
not yet been studied to the best of our knowledge.
10.4 Images
Shoshitaishvili et al. [38] combine facial recognition, and spatial
analysis to determine user pairs that are dating amongst people
represented in a large corpus of pictures shared on a social network.
Ilia et al. [17] propose an access control mechanism that allows users
to manage the visibility of their face in photos published by other
users. Research on defenses also mainly focuses on obfuscation of
faces such as person image generation [24], face replacement [40],
redaction [31] etc. Recent work by Orekondy et al. [31] focuses on
localized segments containing text-like attributes such as license
plate, datetime, name, etc . However these approaches are tested
only on small self-annotated datasets and their applicability to
friendship inference in large scale real life datasets is yet to be
explored.
10.5 Hashtags
Highfield and Leaver [16] examine research challenges of working
with hashtags in Instagram in comparison to Twitter. Han et al.
[14] use Instagram and hashtag data to identify teens and adult
age groups via behavioral differences between them. Using the
hashtag #selfie, authors of [39] study the collective behavior of
sharing selfies on Instagram and [20] study the potential dangers
of self portraits. Authors of [25] study the association between
emotion and health with the hashtag #foodporn. Prior work on
privacy implications of hashtags studies location privacy using
hashtags and friendship inference [46]. A recent work [45] uses a
user-hashtag bipartite graph embedding model to infer friendships,
but are hugely outperformed by our method.
10.6 OSNs and Privacy
There has been extensive research on OSN user deanonymization,
based on the network topology [29] or using metadata of tweets
[33]. However the adversary needs to already have access to the
true identity of the target users alongwith metadata of their older
tweets for the latter work. Works on cross-site profile matching
such as [9, 22] utilize only user profile metadata such as name,
profile picture, home location etc. In contrast, we focus on user
generated content, i.e. the multimedia footprint of users built up
over time from the data they post everyday, since this collectively
gives a faithful reflection of the user’s interests. Liu et al. [22] do
consider tweets posted over time as well as friendships but they
perform cross platform linkability. We address a different problem,
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i.e., friendship inference and additionally include hashtags, images,
location check-ins as well.
11 CONCLUSION
We present novel attacks on the privacy of social relationships using
hashtags, images and caption data. We also evaluate state-of-the-art
tools to infer friendships using locations and friendships (between
other pairs) shared on OSNs. We finally focus on adversaries that
use not just one type of user information but combine all available
types of information for the inference attack. We demonstrate that
the success of the friendship inference attacks are greatly ampli-
fied when multiple modes are combined, for example in the LA
dataset, our multimodal attack achieves an AUC of 0.92 whereas the
maximum AUC achieved by any of our monomodal attacks is only
0.8555 (using hashtags). Our experiments on the subset adversaries
demonstrate that although some components clearly outperform
others when used individually, they contribute towards a much
stronger inference when combined together with additional com-
ponents. The fusion mechanism for our multimodal adversary is
capable of exploiting post components that complement each other.
We demonstrate that our attacks are robust to the amount of
information shared by users. As newer data types or trends will
emerge in the world of OSNs in future, the multimedia footprints of
users would get increasingly diverse. The threat to user privacy aris-
ing from such multimodal adversaries would potentially be much
larger. Development of effective defense mechanisms or privacy
advisors is therefore the need of the hour.
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Figure 10: Robustness of our attacks in the LA dataset. The y-
axis shows the AUC attained at various percentage of posts
removed shown in the x-axis
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